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What are the causes of the shadow economy? We provide new answers to this
old question. The sharp distinction between theoretical priors on the institutional
determinants of the shadow economy and the technique used for its measurement is
the ￿rst novel contribution of the paper. The second innovation is that, unlike previ-
ous contributions, we document a speci￿c role for institutional variables in shaping
economic incentives to "go underground", irrespective of the stage of economic de-
velopment. The third innovation is that - after controlling for institutional quality
and for the level of development - public expenditures have a negative impact on
the shadow economy.
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11 Introduction
The existence of a shadow economy has attracted considerable attention by economists
and policymakers. This is hardly surprising. On the one hand, the unobserved component
of national economies accounts for a large share of GDP in poor countries (La Porta and
Shleifer, 2008) and remains important at least in some developed economies like Belgium,
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain (Dell￿ Anno, 2003; Alaæ￿n-Pardo and G￿mez-Antonio,
2005; Dell￿ Anno, G￿mez-Antonio and Alaæ￿n-Pardo, 2007). On the other hand, the ex-
istence of a relatively large informal sector may have important economic consequences.
For instance, the productive potential of uno¢ cial ￿rms is typically constrained by limited
access to public goods (De Soto, 1989, 2000), but tax evasion also limits governments abil-
ity to supply such public goods and may give uno¢ cial ￿rms a substantial cost advantage
(Farrell, 2004; Farrell, Baily and Remes, 2005).
Three di⁄erent views have been put forward to interpret this phenomenon. The ￿rst
one emphasizes the role of institutional quality in shaping incentives to enter the o¢ cial
sector of the economy and is supported by several empirical studies (Friedman, Johnson,
Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton, 2000; Loayza and Rigolini, 2006; Torgler and Schneider,
2007; Chong and Gradstein, 2007; Dabla-Norris, Gradstein and Inchauste, 2008). The
second one gives importance to the inherent ine¢ ciency of uno¢ cial ￿rms (Amaral and
Quintin, 2006; De Paula and Scheinkman, 2008) and looks at the formal and informal
sectors as two parallel economies, where the ine¢ cient informal sector is bound to recede
when growth-enhancing policies raise the skills of the labour force and the quality of the
public goods accessible to o¢ cial ￿rms. In this framework, cross country di⁄erentials in
the relative size of the shadow economy are strictly related to di⁄erent stages of economic
development. Institutional quality therefore matters insofar as it is a pre-requisite for
growth of the o¢ cial economy, but does not play a speci￿c role in determining the size of
the shadow economy. The third one (Dessy and Pallage, 2001) sees government size and
the relative dimension of the shadow economy as jointly endogenous outcomes, suggesting
that a "big push" policy strategy may force the economy to settle in favourable equilibria,
where the supply of public infrastructure and - more generally - of public goods is relatively
large whereas the size of the shadow economy is relatively small.
This paper investigates the distinct roles played by institutions, growth of the o¢ -
cial economy and government size in determining the unobserved economy. To this aim,
we must ￿rst obtain measures of the shadow economy. Unlike previous contributions,
21 we cannot rely on estimates based on the Multiple Indicators and Multiple Causes
(MIMIC) approach. The MIMIC method is used for inferring the dimension of the un-
recorded activity through a set of "causal variables" (taxation, regulatory burden, moral
attitudes toward the state) and "likely indicators" (changes in the demand for currency,
in the labour force participation rate and in o¢ cial GDP). Since variables that identify
institutional quality are typically related to the "causal variables", interpreting MIMIC
estimates on the grounds of institutional factors would be tautological. We must therefore
rely on shadow economy estimates which are independent from the theoretical priors that
drive our subsequent analysis. For this reason, we apply a version of the Modi￿ed Total
Electricity (MTE) approach (Eilat and Zinnes, 2002) to a large panel of countries. This
method obtains shadow economy estimates from electricity consumption data which are
￿ltered to remove the in￿ uence of additional factors such as variations in electricity prices
and in the relative weight of energy-intensive industrial sectors.
The sharp distinction between theoretical priors on the institutional determinants
of the shadow economy and the technique used for its measurement is the ￿rst novel
contribution of the paper. The second innovation is that, by exploiting the time series di-
mension of our panel, we are able to better investigate the link between stage of economic
development - proxied by the o¢ cial level of per-capita income - and the relative size of
shadow economy. The third innovative aspect is that we are able to test the theoreti-
cal contribution of Dessy and Pallage (2001) apparently neglected in previous empirical
contributions.
In a nutshell, our results suggest that all the interpretations of the shadow economy
discussed above contain a grain of truth. We do ￿nd that the stage of development has
a negative e⁄ect on the size of the shadow economy. But we also ￿nd an additional
negative impact for indicators of institutional quality (such as measures of rule of law,
government stability, democratic accountability and regulation of labour). In contrast
with La Porta and Shleifer (2008), these results suggest that the shadow economy should
not be dismissed as the unpleasant side e⁄ect of economic underdevelopment. Instead
this phenomenon seems to be related to some speci￿c institutional aspects that may well
survive even when the economy reaches higher development stages. This may explain why
even some developed economies are characterized by a relatively large share of unrecorded
income. Finally, we ￿nd that - after controlling for institutional quality and for the level of
1Loayza (1996), Giles (1999a, 1999b, 1999c), Chatterjee, Chaudhury and Schneider (2003), Giles,
Tedds and Werkneh (2002), Tedds and Giles (2002), Dell￿ Anno (2003), Bajada and Schneider (2005),
Schneider (2004, 2005, 2008), Alaæ￿n and G￿mez-Antonio (2005), Buehn, Karmann and Schneider (2007),
Dell￿ Anno, G￿mez-Antonio and Alaæ￿n-Pardo (2007), Brambila-Macias (2008).
3development - public expenditure still has a negative impact on the shadow economy. It is
intriguing to relate this latter result to a long-standing controversy about the distinct roles
of "institutions" and "macroeconomic policies" in determining economic outcomes. Our
￿ndings support the view that macroeconomic policies should not be seen as a mechanical
consequence of a country￿ s institutional setting (Glaeser et al., 2004) in contrast with
Acemoglu et al. (2003) who claim that macroeconomic policies play a minor role in
shaping economic outcomes once institutional variables are taken into account.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 de￿nes the empirical methodology. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5
concludes.
2 The model
La Porta and Shleifer (2008) group the determinants of the uno¢ cial economy into three
broad categories. Costs of becoming formal. These may be de￿ned as "entry costs" in the
o¢ cial market. They are typically associated with the resources devoted to ful￿lling the
procedures required to legally start a business. Costs of staying formal. They include tax
payments and government regulations. Among government regulations, those related to
workers￿welfare are considered the most restrictive and costly for ￿rms (Loayza, 1996).2
As described in Botero et al. (2004), regulation of labour markets may take several forms.
First, governments forbid discrimination in the labour market and endow the workers with
some basic rights (maternity leaves, minimum wage, etc.). Second, governments regulate
employment relationships and may a⁄ect hiring and ￿ring costs. Third, governments may
legally empower labour unions to represent workers collectively. In addition, corruption is
widely believed to raise the cost of staying formal, thereby inducing entrepreneurs to ￿ ee
to the underground economy (Friedman et al. 2000). Bene￿ts of being formal. These are
typically related to expanded access to public goods. Dessy and Pallage (2001) argue that
the provision of a productive public infrastructure creates a productivity premium from
formalization and, symmetrically, an opportunity cost of informality. Thus a relatively
large government sector may be associated to a smaller size of the shadow economy. In
addition, the inability to sign enforceable contracts creates uncertainty and increases the
transaction and monitoring costs in all business dealings conducted in the unobserved
sector (De Soto, 1989; Loayza, 1996).
2Nipon (1991) estimated that informal ￿rms in Thailand, by ignoring labour-protection laws, saved
about 13 to 22 percent of labour wages. Tokman (1992) reported that labour regulations increased costs
for small ￿rms in Latin America by an average of around 20 percent.
4Such costs and bene￿ts may be proxied by institutional factors and policy variables.





where i,t respectively denote country and time indexes3, SH de￿nes the size of the
shadow economy as a percentage of the o¢ cial GDP, y is the log of per-capita GDP,
G is the ratio of public expenditure to o¢ cial GDP and IQj is one of h indicators of
institutional quality, to be de￿ned below.4 As pointed out in the introduction, equation
(1) includes y as a proxy for the stage of economic development, to control whether
institutions and policies play a speci￿c role in determining the size of the shadow economy.
2.1 Variables de￿nition
Estimates for SH are obtained as in Onnis and Tirelli (2010), who apply a version of
the MTE approach proposed by Eilat and Zinnes (2002). This involves a two-stages
procedure. In the ￿rst stage, the series of electricity consumption growth is ￿ltered to
remove the in￿ uence of changes in the weight of the industry sector and in the relative
price of electricity. In the second stage, the growth rate of the shadow economy is obtained
by subtracting the growth rate of the o¢ cial economy from the ￿ltered series of electricity
consumption growth - where the latter proxies the growth rate of the overall economy.5
2.2 Institutional variables
Some of the institutional variables most commonly used in the literature (Torgler and
Schneider, 2007; Chong and Gradstein, 2007) may be seen as proxies for the costs and
bene￿ts associated to formality. The variable rule of law is the sum of two components.
The law component assesses the impartiality of the legal system, and the order component
assesses common observance of the law. We take this index as an index of the bene￿ts
of formalization. The variable democratic accountability captures how responsive the
3We analyse 48 economies over the period 1981-2005. See the Appendix for details.
4Data on y are taken from United Nations, constant (1990) prices, US Dollars. Data on G, are taken
from Penn World Tables.
5Our analysis is based on the assumption that changes in the domestic real price of electricity capture
the e⁄ects of energy supply shocks and of long term e¢ ciency gains caused by technical change, whereas
changes in the industry share of GDP a⁄ect the component of electricity consumption which is directly
related to the country-speci￿c evolution in the composition of domestic output. See the Appendix for a
detailed presentation of the methodology.
5government is to the electorate. The intuition is that accountability reduces policymakers￿
rent seeking activities, thus lowering the costs of being formal. The variable government
stability rates government￿ s ability to stay in o¢ ce and carry out its declared program.
The variable is the sum of three subcomponents: government unity, legislative strength
and popular support. We posit that government stability is an inverse proxy for political
uncertainty, where the latter lowers the bene￿ts from staying in the formal economy. As a
proxy for the regulation of labour, we use an index of workers￿rights protection. Finally,
the variable corruption measures corruption within the political system. Alternatively,
the corruption perception index (cpi) measures the degree to which corruption is perceived
to exist among public o¢ cials and politicians. The cpi is based on 13 di⁄erent expert
and business surveys.6
To test the robustness of our results, we consider four alternative measures of insti-
tutional quality. The democracy indicator is derived from coding of the competitiveness
of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and
constraints on the chief executive. The subcomponent executive constraints refers to
institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether
individuals or collectivities. In addition, the variable civil liberties measures the freedoms
of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal
autonomy without interference from the state. The indicator political rights refers to the
freedom of participation in the political process, including the right to vote freely for
distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public o¢ ce, join political parties
and organizations, and elect politicians who are accountable to the electorate.7
Only for the post-1995 subsample, the Heritage Foundation publishes an index of
economic freedom, de￿ned as the simple average of 7 variables - business freedom, ￿scal
freedom, trade freedom, monetary freedom, ￿nancial freedom, investment freedom and
property rights.8Business freedom is a quantitative measure of the ability to start, operate
6The variables rule of law, democratic accountability, government stability and corruption are taken
from the International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The variables rule of law and democratic accountability range between
0 and 6 with increasing quality; government stability ranges between 0 and 12 with increasing quality;
corruption ranges between 0 and 6 (very high level of corruption).
The corruption perception index (cpi ) - based on 13 di⁄erent expert and business surveys- is published
by Transparency International and ranges between 1 and 10 (very high corruption).
The index of workers￿rights protection is taken from Human Rights Dataset. Worker￿ s rights may be:
(0) severely restricted, (1) somewhat restricted, (2) fully protected.
7The democracy indicator is taken from Polity IV and ranges between 0 and 10 (very high democracy).
Its subcomponent executive constraints ranges between 1 and 7. The variables civil liberties and political
rights (source: Freedom House) range between 1 (least free) and 7 (most free).
8The index of economic freedom and its subcomponents range between 0 and 10 (very high freedom).
6and close a business that represents the overall burden of regulation as well as the e¢ ciency
of government in the regulatory process. Fiscal freedom is a measure of the tax burden
imposed by governments.9 Trade freedom is a measure of the absence of tari⁄ and non-
tari⁄ barriers that a⁄ect imports and exports of good and services. Monetary freedom
combines a measure of price stability with an assessment of price controls.10 Financial
freedom is a measure of banking security as well as a measure of independence from
government control. In fact, state ownership of banks and other ￿nancial institutions
generally lowers the level of available services. Investment freedom measures freedom
to allocate resources into and out of speci￿c activities, both internally and across the
country￿ s borders. Finally, the property rights component is an index of the capability of
individuals to accumulate private property, secured by clear laws that are fully enforced
by the state. We shall include these variables in our analysis for the post-1995 subsample.
3 Methodology
We employ the System GMM technique (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover,
1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) that is considered particularly appropriate for our panel
data.11 This estimator has been, in fact, designed for situations with "small T, large N"
panels, independent variables that are not strictly exogenous, ￿xed e⁄ects, heteroskedas-
ticity and autocorrelation within countries.
The consistency of the System GMM estimator depends on whether lagged values
of the explanatory variables are valid instruments in the regression. We address this
issue by considering three speci￿cation tests: the Arellano-Bond test, the Hansen J test
and the di⁄erence-in-Hansen test. The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation has a null
hypothesis of no autocorrelation and is applied to the di⁄erenced residuals. The ￿rst-order
serial correlation test usually rejects the null hypothesis. Second-order serial correlation
of the di⁄erenced residuals indicates that the original error terms are serially correlated
and follow a moving average process at least of order one. If the AR(2) test fails to reject
the null, the original error terms are, therefore, serially uncorrelated. The Arellano-Bond
test is run on di⁄erenced residuals even after estimation in deviations.12 The Hansen
9Fiscal freedom includes both the direct tax burden in terms of the top tax rates on individual and
corporate incomes and the overall amount of tax revenues as a percentage of GDP.
10Price controls distort o¢ cial markets activity.
11Given the presence of gaps in our panel data, we use orthogonal deviations (Arellano and Bover,
1995).
12The autocorrelation test assumes no correlation across individuals in the idiosyncratic disturbances.
According to Roodman (2006), time dummies make this assumption more likely to hold.
7J test (robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorellation) tests the overall validity of the
instruments, i.e. it tests of whether the instruments, as a group, appear exogenous.
Failure to reject the null hypothesis gives support to the model. Finally, the di⁄erence-
in-Hansen methodology tests the exogeneity of each subgroup of instruments. We split
each instrument subgroup in two for di⁄erence-in-Hansen purposes, one each for the
transformed and level equations. This is especially useful for testing the instruments for
the levels equation based on lagged di⁄erences of the dependent variable, which are the
most suspect in System GMM.
As reported in the literature on GMM methodology, a large collection of instruments,
even if valid in speci￿cation tests, can be collectively invalid in ￿nite samples because they
over￿t endogenous variables.13 Moreover, a large number of instruments also weaken
the Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions. According to Roodman (2006, 2008),
we combine two approaches to instrument containment. The ￿rst one is to use only
certain lags instead of all available lags for instruments.14 The second one is to adopt
the "collapse" suboption which creates one instrument for each variable and lag distance,
rather than one for each time period, variable, and lag distance.15
4 Results
To facilitate discussion we present our estimates in stages. 16 The ￿rst striking result is
that, even if we observe a negative and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect of o¢ cial per-capita
GDP, measures of institutional quality retain a signi￿cant impact on SH: variables rule of
law, democratic accountability and government stability have the expected negative signs
(Table 1). We also ￿nd evidence of a positive and statistically signi￿cant relationship
between protection of workers￿ rights and our estimates of unrecorded income (Table
13Tauchen (1986) demonstrates in simulations of very small samples (50-75 observations) that the bias
of GMM rises as more instruments, based on deeper lags of variables, are introduced. Similar results are
obtained in Ziliak (1997). In Monte Carlo tests of Di⁄erence GMM, Windmeijer (2005) reports that, on
8￿100 panels, reducing the instruments from 28 to 13 reduces the average bias in the two-step estimate
of the parameter of interest by 40%.
14For each variable, the choice of the lags as instruments has been based on the results of the di⁄erence-
in-Hansen tests.
15Following Roodman (2006), to avoid weakening the Hansen test, in the present analysis the instru-
ments count never exceed N.
16For all our system GMM regressions we report the results of the Arellano-Bond and Hansen tests.
We always fail to reject the null hypotheses of no (second-order) autocorrelation and exogeneity of the
entire group of instruments. The results of the single di⁄erence-in-Hansen tests are not reported in the
tables. For both the transformed and the level equation, we always fail to reject the null hypothesis of
exogeneity for each subgroup of instruments. Results available upon request.
82). In addition, in line with the theoretical results in Dessy and Pallage (2001), public
expenditures have a negative impact on the shadow economy. To check whether our
results are distorted by plausible correlations among the variables rule of law, democratic
accountability and government stability, we re-estimate equation (1) for the entire panel
of countries by using the simple average of the three institutional indicators.17 The
relationship between this aggregate measure and the size of unobserved sector is still
negative and statistically signi￿cant. We also apply a Principal Component Analysis to
these three institutional variables and extract the ￿rst component (PCA).18 Again, we
observe a negative and statistically signi￿cant relationship between PCA and SH. As
a robustness check we substitute rule of law, democratic accountability and government
stability with democracy indicator, executive constraints, civil liberties and political rights
(Tables 3 and 4). All expected results are con￿rmed.
In Table 5 we explore the impact of corruption on the size of unobserved economy.
Adopting the two alternative measures of corruption, we ￿nd that the e⁄ect on the un-
observed economy is always negative and statistically signi￿cant. 19 This is consistent
with the theoretical predictions of Choi and Thum (2005, p. 829). In their model the
entrepreneurs￿option to operate in the shadow economy constrains a corrupt o¢ cial￿ s
ability to extract rents and strengthens the productivity of the o¢ cial sector. The exis-
tence of the uno¢ cial sector therefore acts as a complement to the o¢ cial economy. In
their framework corruption depends on the policymaker￿ s ability to monitor o¢ cial ￿rms
activity. Therefore, when the monitoring technology improves participation in the shadow
economy becomes relatively less attractive compared to participation in the o¢ cial econ-
omy and corruption will increase. In addition, the average dimension of uno¢ cial ￿rms
will shrink in order to escape monitoring. Both e⁄ects might therefore induce a fall in
the share of the unobserved economy.
Finally, we focus on the post-1995 subsample. The ￿rst step is to re-estimate the
regression in column 2 of Table 2 over the shorter sample. Variables rule of law, govern-
17These have been normalized to the same scale range.
18The Principal component analysis (PCA) involves a mathematical procedure that transforms a num-
ber of possibly correlated variables into a smaller number of uncorrelated variables called principal com-
ponents. The ￿rst principal component accounts for as much of the variability in the data as possible,
and each succeeding component accounts for as much of the remaining variability as possible.
19In a very small sample, Johnson et al. (1998), ￿nd a positive relationship between di⁄erent measures
of corruption and the shadow economy. Dreher and Schneider (2010), who apply the MIMIC method to
obtain shadow economy estimates in a large sample of countries over the period 2000-2002, distinguish
between high and low income countries. They cannot ￿nd a robust relationship between corruption and
the size of the shadow economy when perceptions-based indices of corruption are used. An alternative
corruption index estimated applying the MIMIC method is found to positively a⁄ect the shadow economy
only in low income countries .
9ment stability, protection of workers rights and public expenditure remain signi￿cant with
the expected signs, whereas democratic accountability is no longer signi￿cant (Table 6).
Then we add the index of economic freedom and, in separate regressions, its components
as de￿ned in Section 2 above. We present results for those regressions where these latter
variables a⁄ect previous results. We ￿nd that the index of economic freedom is signi￿cant
with the expected negative sign, but rule of law no longer matters. Similar results obtain
when we replace the index of economic freedom with its components business freedom and
￿scal freedom. By contrast, we couldn￿ t ￿nd evidence of a speci￿c role for other compo-
nents of the index, such as ￿nancial freedom and investment freedom. This latter result
suggests that restrictions to business activity and tax policies play a paramount role in
determining the shadow economy.
5 Conclusions
Theoretical models suggest that the shadow economy is a constraint on economic ef-
￿ciency. Our results show that triggering faster growth of the o¢ cial economy is not a
panacea for this, even though it has unambiguously bene￿cial e⁄ects. In fact, institutional
design and even government size may determine additional cross-country di⁄erences in
the relative size of the shadow economy. Thus, both institutional design and public ex-
penditure policies should speci￿cally target private sector￿ s incentives to enter the o¢ cial
economy. This is a promising ￿eld for future research.
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Any attempt to exploit electricity consumption to estimate the shadow economy should
address the issue of the empirical stability of the energy-consumption-to-GDP ratio. Crit-
ics emphasize the potential downward bias caused by energy-saving technological change.
The argument is straightforward and quite intuitive, but it neglects a long-standing debate
on the Jevons￿Paradox: it cannot be taken for granted that energy-saving technologi-
cal change will reduce the energy intensity of aggregate production (Jevons, 1865, 1965;
Iorgulescu and Polimeni, 2007; Polimeni and Iorgulescu, 2007Grant, Hanley, McGregor,
Swales and Turner, 2007). In fact, computable general equilibrium models support the
view that energy consumption might "rebound" because energy demand is at best weakly
correlated with a more e¢ cient energy use. The reason why this might happen is easily
explained. Following an improvement in energy e¢ ciency, market forces drive some coun-
tervailing e⁄ects: (i) the fall in energy prices triggers a substitution e⁄ect towards more
energy-intensive goods and production techniques; (ii) the income e⁄ect raises household
consumption of all commodities, including energy consumption. In addition, the down-
ward bias might be o⁄set by other forms of technological change, such as labor-saving
innovations, which increase the energy intensity of the production function. For instance,
early econometric work has shown that in the US manufacturing sector technical change
has been energy intensive (Jorgenson and Fraumeni, 1981; Hogan and Jorgenson, 1991).
Finally, one should bear in mind that sectoral specialization might change as the economy
develops, thereby a⁄ecting the energy intensity of production.
The ￿rst stage of our application of the MTE procedure is therefore based on the
following equation:
￿Eleci;t = ￿i + ￿1￿Epricei;t + ￿2￿IndGdpi;t + "i;t (2)
where subscripts t;i are time and country indexes, ￿Elec, ￿Eprice and ￿IndGdp re-
spectively describe annual percentage changes in electricity consumption, in the real price
of electricity and in the industry share of GDP.
Once the relative-price and demand-composition e⁄ects have been identi￿ed, the resid-
ual changes in electricity consumption, ￿Elecres, may be used as a proxy for the growth
rate in the overall (recorded and unrecorded) economic activity:
￿Elec
res
i;t = ￿Eleci;t ￿ [￿1￿Epricei;t + ￿2￿IndGdpi;t] (3)
Then, the growth rate of the unrecorded economy, ￿SH, was obtained as follows:
24￿SHi;t = ￿Elec
res
i;t ￿ ￿Gdpi;t (4)
where ￿Gdp denotes the o¢ cial GDP growth rate. Finally, by applying ￿SH to pre-
existing base-year estimates, we obtain our measures of the unrecorded economy as a
share of o¢ cial GDP.20
The panel composition depends on the availability of data about electricity consump-
tion, electricity price and share of industry21. Data on electricity consumption, real price
of electricity, share of industrial income and o¢ cial GDP have been obtained from En-
ergy Information Administration, International Energy Agency, World Bank and United
Nations, respectively.
Since the time series dimension of the panel is relatively long, the econometric method-
ology is based on a preliminary stationarity and cointegration analysis of the relevant
variables. Variables ￿Elec, ￿Eprice, ￿IndGdp exhibit non stationarity, tested using
Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003), Pesaran (2003, 2007), Hadri (2000), Kwiatkowski, Phillips,
Schmidt and Shin (1992), ADF and Phillips-Perron unit root tests. A cointegrating re-
lationships between ￿Elec, ￿Eprice and ￿IndGdp has been, therefore, detected using
the residual-based procedure developed by Pedroni (1999, 2004).
Due to the presence of cointegrated time series, in our estimate of equation (2) we use
the group-mean panel Fully Modi￿ed Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS) method proposed
by Pedroni (2000, 2001). The group-FMOLS estimates suggest that a positive and sta-
tistically signi￿cant relationship exists between the changes in electric consumption and
those in the share of industry. On the contrary, a negative and statistically signi￿cant
relationship exists between the changes in electric consumption and those in electricity
price. 22
20We have adopted the estimates of Johnson et al. (1997)- for the transition economies- and Lacko
(1996, 1998)- for the OECD and Developing countries. The base-year estimate for Tanzania is from
Bagachwa and Nasho (1995).
21Countries in the sample are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech R., Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hun-
gary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Morocco, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Slovak R., Spain, Sri Lanka, Swe-
den, Switzerland, Tanzania, Tunisia, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela.
22To use changes in country-speci￿c electricity price as an explanatory variable for changes in electricity
consumption may generate problems of endogeneity. Firstly, we have re-estimated equation (2) adopting
an alternative more exogenous real price of energy for 26 OECD countries and a global index of energy
price for the remaining 22 countries. Second, we have used the global price of energy for the entire panel.
In both situations we have obtained the same result. There is a positive and statistically signi￿cant
relationship between changes in electricity consumption and changes in industry share of GDP. There is
a negative and statistically signi￿cant relationship between changes in electricity usage and changes in
the price of energy.
25